124 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
124 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
package httpapi
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"textmachine/platform/internal/auth"
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"textmachine/platform/internal/reqid"
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)
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// APIPrefix is the contract's base path.
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const APIPrefix = "/v0"
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// readyProbeTimeout bounds the readiness ping. The endpoint is unauthenticated, and without its own
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// deadline a stuck database turns every probe into a held connection (PD-14).
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const readyProbeTimeout = 2 * time.Second
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// LoginSurface is the sign-in flow, as this package needs to see it.
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type LoginSurface interface {
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Routes(guard func(http.Handler) http.Handler) http.Handler
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}
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// Prober is what readiness needs from the database: not "is it reachable" but "is it the database
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// this build was made for". Reachability alone reported ready against a Postgres with no schema.
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type Prober interface {
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Ready(ctx context.Context) error
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}
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// Deps is everything the HTTP surface is built from.
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type Deps struct {
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Log *slog.Logger
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// DB is nil when no database is configured: the service still starts and still answers
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// liveness, and readiness reports why it is not ready.
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DB Prober
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Auth *auth.Authenticator
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// TrustedOrigins are origins besides our own allowed to make unsafe requests.
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TrustedOrigins []string
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// HSTS asks browsers never to speak plain http to this host again. Off in the dev profile: the
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// policy is pinned per host and localhost would keep it long after the experiment.
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HSTS bool
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// Login, when set, is mounted at /auth/. It is handed the session guard rather than sitting
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// behind one: the surface that CREATES a session cannot require one, and the surface that ends
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// a session must.
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Login LoginSurface
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}
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// New builds the handler.
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//
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// Contract routes are registered on the SAME mux as the ops ones, with the version prefix written
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// into the pattern, and each is wrapped in guard(). One mux is what keeps Request.Pattern
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// meaningful all the way out to the access log — a nested mux behind http.StripPrefix hands the
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// inner handler a copy, and the pattern the copy learns never comes back.
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func New(d Deps) (http.Handler, error) {
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if d.Auth == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("httpapi: no authenticator: the API subtree may not be served unguarded")
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}
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csrf, err := auth.CSRF(d.TrustedOrigins, d.Auth.Cookies.SessionName(),
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ProblemHandler(http.StatusForbidden, "Cross-origin request rejected"))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Every API route goes through this. An anonymous caller therefore gets 401 before 404, which
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// is deliberate: the shape of the surface is not public information.
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//
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// The body limit is per ROUTE, not a blanket outer layer: MaxBytesReader wrapping an already
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// wrapped body keeps the tighter limit, so an upload route could never raise its own above a
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// shared default. The book upload registers guard(maxUpload, …) when it lands.
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guard := func(maxBody int64, h http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return LimitBody(maxBody)(csrf(d.Auth.Require(h)))
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}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.Handle("GET /healthz", http.HandlerFunc(healthz))
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mux.Handle("GET /readyz", readyz(d.DB, d.Log))
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if d.Login != nil {
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// The subtree still gets the body cap and the CSRF check — sign-out is a POST, and a
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// cross-site page must not be able to make one. Rate limiting lives inside the flow, which
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// knows which of its endpoints is the unauthenticated one.
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mux.Handle("/auth/", LimitBody(DefaultMaxBody)(csrf(d.Login.Routes(d.Auth.Require))))
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}
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// TODO(P-1): the contract routes mount here; until then the prefix is a guarded 404.
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// The contract's base path is written here and nowhere else. Ops endpoints stay outside it: a
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// health check is not part of the versioned surface and must not move when the surface does.
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mux.Handle(APIPrefix+"/", guard(DefaultMaxBody, ProblemHandler(http.StatusNotFound, "Object not found")))
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// Recover sits INSIDE AccessLog: a panic converted to a 500 still produces a log line, whereas
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// a panic unwinding past the logger produces none.
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return reqid.Middleware(SecurityHeaders(d.HSTS)(AccessLog(d.Log)(Recover(d.Log)(mux)))), nil
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}
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// healthz is liveness: the process is up and serving. It touches nothing, so a database outage
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// cannot make a supervisor kill a healthy process.
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func healthz(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok\n"))
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}
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// readyz is readiness: this instance can serve traffic, which means the database answers.
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func readyz(db Prober, log *slog.Logger) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if db == nil {
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WriteProblem(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "Not ready", "no database configured")
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return
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), readyProbeTimeout)
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defer cancel()
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if err := db.Ready(ctx); err != nil {
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// The reason goes to the LOG and not to the wire. Both halves are deliberate: a
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// swallowed dependency failure is a defect of its own (PD-16), and /readyz is
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// unauthenticated, so "the schema is two migrations behind" is a fact about our rollout
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// that no anonymous caller needs. An operator has the log line.
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log.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "readiness probe failed", "err", err)
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WriteProblem(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "Not ready", "database not ready")
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ready\n"))
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})
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}
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