# Architecture ## The data path ``` routed app │ (only apps allowed by the per-app filter; see below) ▼ VpnService tun ProxyVpnService.establish() │ IPv4 198.18.0.1/32, route 0.0.0.0/0, DNS = dnsServerFor(settings) │ (IPv6 fc00::1/128 ULA + ::/0 ONLY when settings.ipv6 = true) ▼ hev-socks5-tunnel native engine, reads the tun fd over JNI (Tun2Socks / tun2socks.c) │ config built by ProxyVpnService.buildEngineConfig() (a small YAML blob) │ speaks SOCKS5 upstream only → points at our loopback server ▼ LocalSocks5Server 127.0.0.1:, random per-session user/pass │ RFC 1928/1929; handles CONNECT (TCP) and UDP ASSOCIATE ▼ Upstream client Socks5Upstream | HttpUpstream | ShadowsocksUpstream │ socket is VpnService.protect()-ed → it exits the tunnel, no loop ▼ real proxy server → internet ``` **Why a local SOCKS5 server in the middle?** `hev-socks5-tunnel` only speaks SOCKS5 to its upstream. To support HTTP(S) and Shadowsocks upstreams we run our own loopback SOCKS5 server that hev forwards into, and *it* translates to whatever the configured upstream speaks. This loopback-bridge pattern is standard for this engine. The bridge is gated with a random per-session username/password so a non-whitelisted local app can't hijack it. **Why the upstream socket is `protect()`-ed.** Without `protect()`, the upstream connection would itself be captured by the tun and loop. `protect()` excludes that socket from the VPN. (Note: `protect()` returning `false` here is benign — our own app is already excluded by the app filter — so we log and continue, never throw. See conventions.md.) ## Connect / restart / stop sequence The `VpnService` is driven by three intent actions (`ProxyVpnService.ACTION_START` / `ACTION_STOP` / `ACTION_RESTART`; static helpers `ProxyVpnService.start/stop/restart(context)`): 1. UI tap → `MainActivity` calls `VpnService.prepare()` (consent dialog, or null when the `ACTIVATE_VPN` appop is granted) → `ProxyVpnService.start()`. 2. `onStartCommand(ACTION_START)` promotes to foreground immediately (the 5 s FGS window starts here), then runs `startTunnel()` on a dedicated lifecycle thread. 3. `startTunnel()` → `establish()` builds the tun → starts `LocalSocks5Server` → `buildEngineConfig()` → starts the native engine (generation counter + stuck-engine reaper) → fires the one-shot upstream **probe**. 4. `MainViewModel.reconnectIfRunning()` sends `ACTION_RESTART` when the active server or the app filter changes while connected. `ACTION_STOP` tears down and `stopSelf()`s. To touch lifecycle, start at `onStartCommand` / `startTunnel` / `establish`, not the 700-line file top. ## Components - **`service/ProxyVpnService`** — the heart. Builds the tun (`establish()`), starts/stops the native engine with a generation counter + a stuck-engine reaper thread, runs a one-shot upstream connectivity **probe** after connect (journal flips to «Прокси подтверждён» or a classified error), watches network changes, owns the foreground notification. - **`service/VpnState`** — `StateFlow` holder for status, stats, and the journal (`TunnelEvent` list). The UI observes this; the service writes it. - **`core/socks/LocalSocks5Server`** — the loopback bridge. Accept loop on a control dispatcher, relay on a separate dispatcher, a both-directions idle watchdog, per-session auth. - **`core/upstream/*`** — `Upstream` is the interface (`connectTcp`, `openUdpAssociation`, `protect`). Three implementations. `Socks5Upstream` also does UDP ASSOCIATE with a BND.ADDR rewrite for broken servers (see conventions.md). - **`core/crypto/*`** — Shadowsocks AEAD (SIP004): `ShadowsocksCrypto` (EVP_BytesToKey master key, HKDF-SHA1 subkey, AES-GCM / ChaCha20-Poly1305 `Aead`), `ShadowsocksStream` (the TCP chunk framing + UDP packet framing). Implemented on platform JCA — no extra crypto dep. - **`core/ConfigImport`** — parses `ss://` (SIP002 + legacy), `socks5://`, `http(s)://` share links into `ProxyConfig`. - **`data/ConfigStore`** — the only persistence. One DataStore Preferences entry `state` holding `ProxyState` JSON (`configs` + `settings`). Keeps a last-known-good backup and recovers from it rather than wiping on a decode failure. - **`ui/`** — `MainScreen` hosts a 4-tab `HorizontalPager`: `ConnectionScreen`, `ServersScreen`, `AppsScreen`, `SettingsScreen`. `MainViewModel` bridges UI ↔ `ConfigStore`/`VpnState`. - **native** — `tun2socks.c` is the JNI bridge (start/stop, hands the tun fd + YAML config to hev). `hev-socks5-tunnel/` is the vendored engine; its `hev-mapped-dns.c` fake-DNS facility is what makes domain routing possible and is enabled via a `mapdns:` config block (see Domain routing below). ## Per-app routing (model for any future per-target filtering) `AppSettings.allowedApps: Set` drives `ProxyVpnService.applyAppFilter()`: - **non-empty** → whitelist: `builder.addAllowedApplication(pkg)` for each (skipping our own package). If *every* selected package is uninstalled it throws rather than silently routing everything (that would violate the whitelist contract). - **empty** → route everything except our own app (`addDisallowedApplication(self)`). This is an **OS-level filter keyed by app UID**. It is the model the "Apps" tab exposes. Note that anything keyed by *destination* (domain/IP) is NOT an OS feature and cannot reuse this — it has to be decided in the data path (the local SOCKS5 server sees the destination host). That is exactly how the "Сайты" tab works, below. ## Domain routing ("Сайты" tab) `AppSettings.routedSites: Set` + `routingMode: RoutingMode` add a **destination-keyed** proxy-vs-direct split *on top of* the per-app filter — orthogonal layers: per-app decides which apps enter the tun; domain routing decides, within that traffic, where each destination goes. The data path is IP-only by the time it reaches hev (the OS already resolved the domain), so domains are recovered with hev's **mapped-DNS / fake-IP** facility, enabled only when `routedSites` is non-empty: 1. `buildEngineConfig()` emits a `mapdns:` block (synthetic resolver `198.18.0.2:53`, fake-IP pool `198.19.0.0/16`, `cache-size 10000`); `establish()` points the tun's DNS at `198.18.0.2`. 2. hev intercepts A-queries to that resolver, answers with a fake IP from the pool, and on the resulting TCP connection **reverse-maps the fake IP back to the original domain**, sending it upstream as a SOCKS5 *domain* CONNECT (`hev-mapped-dns.c` + `misc/hev-utils.c`). 3. `LocalSocks5Server` now sees the real domain in `dest.host`; `core/route/SiteRouter` picks PROXY (the existing upstream path) or DIRECT (a `protect()`-ed socket dialed straight to the host on the underlying non-VPN network, via `ProxyVpnService` as `DirectDialer`) — both reuse the same half-close relay. Entries are explicit suffix domains (`example.com` ⇒ it + all subdomains) or geosite categories (`geosite:netflix`). The full MIT v2fly `geosite.dat` (`assets/geosite/`, ~1500 categories, refresh via `tools/fetch-geosite.sh`) is parsed lazily by `core/route/GeositeIndex` (a small hand-rolled protobuf reader, no dependency) into a process-shared index used both by the Сайты search (live category/domain suggestions) and by `SiteRouter` at tunnel build. `RoutingMode` is the global default and the list is the exceptions: `PROXY_ALL` ⇒ listed go direct; `DIRECT_ALL` ⇒ listed go through the proxy. **Known limitation — DNS that bypasses the fake resolver isn't split.** hev only diverts UDP whose destination is exactly the advertised resolver `198.18.0.2:53`. An app that hardcodes its own resolver (e.g. `8.8.8.8`), or uses DoH/DoT/QUIC, never hits the fake DNS, so its flows arrive as IP literals and take the **global default**. Under `DIRECT_ALL` that means a site the user added to go *through the proxy* can still exit direct if its app resolves on its own. Closing this would require hijacking all `:53` (and ideally DoH) in the engine — a possible follow-up. (Also: synthesized answers carry TTL=1 and only A records; AAAA/HTTPS-SVCB get an empty answer, which is fine while v6 is suppressed but strips HTTP/3 hints.) **Known limitation — UDP is not domain-routed.** Only `handleConnect` (TCP) consults the router; `handleUdpAssociate` always sends UDP through the proxy (and an HTTP(S) upstream, which has no UDP relay, drops it). So QUIC / HTTP-3 is proxied regardless of mode — under `DIRECT_ALL` a "direct" site's QUIC still traverses the proxy. TCP is the routed path; UDP direct-routing is a possible follow-up (it needs a protected per-destination UDP relay, mindful of the §3 anti-spoof invariant). Mapped-DNS is **IPv4-only**, so while `routedSites` is non-empty the tun is forced IPv4-only (v6 suppressed regardless of `settings.ipv6`) to stop dual-stack apps bypassing the split over v6. ## State & status - `ProxyState` = `{ configs: List, settings: AppSettings }`. `activeConfig` is `settings.activeConfigId` (or the first config). - The tunnel is built from a *snapshot* of the active config; live/green UI styling keys off the applied config id, not the merely-selected server. - Settings take effect only at `establish()` / `buildEngineConfig()` time. `MainViewModel` force-restarts a running tunnel (`reconnectIfRunning()` → `ACTION_RESTART`) when the active server, the app filter, or the site list / routing mode changes. ### Status & journal `service/VpnState` (a set of `StateFlow`s) is the service↔UI contract. To surface a step in the UI, call `VpnState.event(label, detail?, tone)` — `tone ∈ {NEUTRAL, OK, WARN, ERROR}`. Events are a ring buffer (`MAX_EVENTS = 30`); `ConnectionScreen` renders them newest-first with auto-scroll. This is the *only* channel the service uses to report progress (connect steps, the probe verdict, errors) — use it rather than inventing a parallel one.