fix(socks5): rewrite unroutable UDP relay to proxy host, connect() socket anti-spoof, validate reply versions

app/src/main/java/chat/vojo/proxy/core/upstream/Socks5Upstream.kt

@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ class Socks5Upstream(
     private val protector: SocketProtector,
 ) : Upstream {
 
+    // RFC 1929 username/password fields are each 1–255 bytes, so user/pass auth
+    // needs a username — a password-only config can't form a valid request (it would
+    // send ULEN=0). Gate auth on the username; a strict server would reject otherwise.
     private val auth: Boolean get() = cfg.username.isNotEmpty()
 
     override fun connectTcp(dest: Destination): UpstreamConn {
@@ -81,11 +84,16 @@ class Socks5Upstream(
         out.write(msg)
         out.flush()
         val res = inp.readExact(2)
+        // RFC 1929 reply is [VER=1][STATUS]. Validate the version too: a misframed
+        // reply whose 2nd byte happens to be 0x00 must not be read as auth success
+        // and then corrupt the following CONNECT exchange.
+        if (res[0].toInt() != 0x01) throw IOException("bad socks5 auth version ${res[0].toInt() and 0xff}")
         if (res[1].toInt() != 0x00) throw IOException("socks5 auth failed")
     }
 
     private fun readReply(inp: InputStream) {
         val head = inp.readExact(4) // VER, REP, RSV, ATYP
+        if (head[0].toInt() != 0x05) throw IOException("bad socks5 reply version ${head[0].toInt() and 0xff}")
         if (head[1].toInt() != 0x00) throw IOException("socks5 connect failed, rep=${head[1].toInt() and 0xff}")
         // consume BND.ADDR + BND.PORT
         when (head[3].toInt() and 0xff) {
@@ -131,6 +139,7 @@ private class Socks5UdpAssociation(
             out.write(byteArrayOf(0x05, 0x03, 0x00, ATYP_IPV4.toByte(), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0))
             out.flush()
             val head = inp.readExact(4)
+            if (head[0].toInt() != 0x05) throw IOException("bad socks5 reply version ${head[0].toInt() and 0xff}")
             if (head[1].toInt() != 0x00) throw IOException("udp associate failed rep=${head[1].toInt() and 0xff}")
             val addr: InetAddress
             when (head[3].toInt() and 0xff) {
@@ -145,9 +154,21 @@ private class Socks5UdpAssociation(
             }
             val portBytes = inp.readExact(2)
             val port = ((portBytes[0].toInt() and 0xff) shl 8) or (portBytes[1].toInt() and 0xff)
-            // Some proxies return 0.0.0.0 — fall back to the proxy host.
+            // The relay BND.ADDR is frequently unusable: 0.0.0.0 ("send to the host
-            val target = if (addr.isAnyLocalAddress) InetAddress.getByName(cfg.host) else addr
+            // you connected to") or an internal/private address only routable inside
+            // the proxy's own network (this matters in practice — e.g. a proxy that
+            // returns 10.x). In every such case the relay actually lives at the proxy
+            // host we already reached over the control channel, so use that and keep
+            // only the advertised port. Without this, UDP/DNS silently black-holes.
+            val target = if (addr.isUnroutableRelay()) InetAddress.getByName(cfg.host) else addr
             relay = InetSocketAddress(target, port)
+            // Pin the UDP socket to the relay endpoint. RFC 1928 §7 requires dropping any
+            // datagram whose source isn't the association's relay; a kernel connect()
+            // enforces that on the (IP, port) 2-tuple for free, and the ephemeral local-port
+            // binding is the off-path DNS-spoofing defence. This is what mainstream clients
+            // (sing-box, v2ray) do — a compliant relay always answers from BND.PORT (here the
+            // post-rewrite endpoint), so connecting never black-holes a legitimate reply.
+            runCatching { udp.connect(relay) }
             control.soTimeout = 0
             watchControl()
         } catch (e: Throwable) {
@@ -204,3 +225,19 @@ private class Socks5UdpAssociation(
         runCatching { control.close() }
     }
 }
+
+/**
+ * True when a SOCKS5 UDP-associate BND.ADDR can't be reached by this client and the
+ * relay should instead be addressed at the proxy host: the wildcard (0.0.0.0/::),
+ * loopback, link-local, or a private/internal address the proxy advertised from inside
+ * its own network — RFC1918 + fec0::/10 (isSiteLocalAddress), CGNAT 100.64/10, ULA fc00::/7.
+ */
+private fun InetAddress.isUnroutableRelay(): Boolean {
+    if (isAnyLocalAddress || isLoopbackAddress || isLinkLocalAddress || isSiteLocalAddress) return true
+    val a = address
+    return when (a.size) {
+        4 -> (a[0].toInt() and 0xff) == 100 && (a[1].toInt() and 0xff) in 64..127 // CGNAT 100.64/10
+        16 -> (a[0].toInt() and 0xfe) == 0xfc                                      // ULA fc00::/7
+        else -> false
+    }
+}